On March 11, 2011, a magnitude M W 9.0 thrust earthquake ruptured the Japan Trench along the northwest coast of Honshu and generated a tsunami that killed 15,894 people, left 2585 missing (as of March 2017) and destroyed more than 130,000 houses. The purpose of this paper is to review the current status and scope of tsunami recovery in the Tohoku region, focusing on investments in structural protection measures as well as extensive implementation of non-structural "managed retreat." Japan's response to the 2011 tsunami contrasts with approaches to disaster management in the USA and elsewhere in the world. New structural protections built in Japan since 2011 include a massive concrete-lined tsunami barrier system, stretching > 400 km of coast, at a cost of at least $8 billion. Managed retreat is a relatively new area of research and risk management focusing on withdrawal of infrastructure and population from at-risk areas. Japan's post-tsunami disaster response may represent the single largest case of disaster-related managed retreat in recent world history. Approximately 145,000 homes, including whole new towns, are being built outside the tsunami hazard zone. Disaster managers worldwide should look to Japan for lessons learned from the investment and efforts since 2011.
Introduction
US researchers joined Japanese colleagues in the Tohoku region during November of 2018 to assess tsunami recovery efforts, including "managed retreat" initiatives in particular. Managed retreat (aka "managed realignment") involves selective retreat away from sealevel rise, flooding, and other natural hazards. Managed retreat emphasizes mitigation actions, typically non-structural measures, that adapt to natural processes and change-in contrast to structural measures that protect human infrastructure. In response to flooding of both coastlines and river floodplains, managed retreat can involve selective relocation of communities out of high-hazard areas. Over the past ~ 150 years, 20-30 US towns have moved off floodplains or away from coasts. Current examples include Isle de Jean Charles in the Louisiana delta and Newtok, Alaska. Worldwide, many millions of residents may be forced to retreat from coastal areas in coming decades due to climate change (Hauer et al. 2016) . Identifying best practices for managed retreat, from local communities to the national level, is increasingly pressing.
The 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami caused economic losses estimated at ¥16.9 trillion (approximately $210 billion) or about 4% of Japan's gross domestic product (GDP). Wave run-up reached as high as ~ 40 m and extended as far as 10 km inland. Damages to housing, commercial and industrial facilities, machinery, etc., are estimated at ¥10.4 trillion or 62% of the total damage. The tsunami destroyed 130,000 houses and severely damaged another 270,000 residences. Immediately following the tsunami, more than 470,000 people were housed at evacuation centers. Many residents remained in these centers for months and in some transitional shelters for years. As of September of 2017, 80,000 evacuees remained displaced (Japan Reconstruction Agency 2017). Post-tsunami recovery continues today, with ¥32 trillion (approx. $265 billion) allocated for reconstruction and protection efforts, with a planned completion date of 2020.
There are both differences and similarities between Japanese and US approaches to deal with disasters. Much of the area impacted by the Tohoku tsunami was rural. Rural populations in both Japan and the USA have been declining during recent decades, with most rural towns now significantly smaller than their twentieth-century peaks, and age structures skewed toward the elderly. For post-disaster relocation initiatives, large elderly populations have special needs. In the case of Pattonsburg, Missouri, which was severely flooded in 1993, almost 75% of the population was 65 years old and older (MSEMA 1999) . During Pattonsburg's subsequent wholesale reconstruction off the floodplain, senior citizen housing and a senior-friendly town design were high priorities. Ibasho House in Ofunato city is a drop-in center established to serve senior citizens displaced by the tsunami. A traditional farmhouse was moved to the site and renovated by elderly local residents, with financial support from a US-based NGO and private companies. The goal of Ibasho House was to help merge in-coming senior citizen tsunami refugees into the community-a mix of relocated and existing population-through self-organizing community activities.
Post-tsunami community relocations
One of the hallmarks of Japan's recovery from the 2011 tsunami is a sweeping relocation program. With ~ 400,000 structures destroyed and about half a million people displaced, the central government forbade residential reconstruction within the most hazardous area impacted by the 2011 tsunami. Numerous small villages as well as urban housing areas were declared off-limits to residential use in perpetuity; selected reconstruction of commercial and industrial properties was allowed. To replace the housing lost to the tsunami, approximately 145,000 residences are being reconstructed in higher areas with government financial support. Japan's response is in sharp contrast to the, at best, halting efforts to step away from flood hazard after major US disasters. After the great Missouri and Mississippi River flood of 1993, the US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided funding to move 7700 properties off the affected floodplains at a cost of $56.3 million, but FEMA buyouts remain a small fraction of at-risk properties in the USA. In fact, in the years after the 1993 flood, new infrastructure made of several billion dollars has been built on land that was under water in 1993 and still at risk of flooding today (Pinter 2005) . Across the USA, many landowners strongly object to mandatory buyouts, and FEMA only pursues voluntary property acquisitions. Partial buyouts can negatively impact the remaining community.
In interviews and discussions in Japan, at least part of the impetus for major change was the shocking loss of life in 2011. The USA has experienced 238 weather and climate disasters since 1980 with damages of $1 billion or more (inflation-adjusted; NOAA 2018). But none of these disasters-not even Katrina and the inundation of New Orleans in 2005-has approached the fatalities in the Tohoku area in 2011. In our interviews in the central tsunami area, nearly every resident had lost one or more family members, close friends, or coworkers. In Kitakami, within the city of Ishinomaki, only three of 57 residents who sought refuge in the District office building survived the tsunami. Among the fatalities were 20 district officials (Fig. 1) .
Japan not only removed residents from the tsunami hazard zone of the Tohoku region, but rebuilt new housing stock, including whole new communities on higher and safer ground. Throughout the tsunami-affected zone, the Japanese government is building 29,743 public and 18,233 private housing units at relocation sites. Most of these new residences are completed, but construction continues. For example, 10,000 of the City of Higashimatsushima's 40,000 residents were displaced by the tsunami. At present, 7500 of those residents have been relocated, including in seven all-new communities (Fig. 2) . Another 2000 residents left the area, and approximately 500 residents located at the inland margins of the area elevated their homes and rebuilt on the same sites. The seven new Higashimatsushima communities, like relocation sites throughout the tsunami zone, include a mix of private and public housing. Homeowners received packages of donations, government subsidies, subsidized loans, and buyout payments generally covering ~ 40% of relocation and rebuilding costs, and extensive public housing was built to accommodate low-income and elderly residents who could not manage the additional costs. Homeowner tsunami damages are covered by earthquake insurance in Japan, but penetration rates were only 39% in 2011 (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 2014).
Japanese culture strives to be harmonious, whereas Americans are more individualistic (Hofstede 1983; Tobin et al. 1989) . Although politically unpopular, Japanese citizens accepted a 2.1% income tax surcharge to help pay for recovery (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 2014) . In contrast, the National Flood Insurance Program in the USA accrued a $20 billion deficit after Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy (GAO 2013), a systemic shortfall that continues to grow. The collective national response in Japan can be attributed to the scale of tsunami disaster, but also a shared national history of disaster recovery and cultural traditions. Following the 2011 tsunami, Japanese leaders strove to maintain community integrity by supporting surviving social bonds and encouraging new caring relationships during the years many survivors were in temporary housing. In one town, social committee members were 1 3 Fig. 1 Onagawa in northeastern Japan's Miyagi Prefecture before, shortly after, and five years after the tsunami of March 2011. The town's population exceeded 10,000 before the disaster, but dropped by 37% thereafter. Within 5 years, significant reconstruction was underway. Top image by Tadao Yoshimura; others are from Kyodo News; reprinted with permission designated to check twice daily on vulnerable people. One community leader's comment, "no one should die alone here," exemplifies the philosophy that persisted throughout the relocation process.
Community-based planning was widely implemented in the Tohoku region recovery efforts (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 2014). Disaster survivors tend to be more satisfied with recovery outcomes if they are included in the planning process (Ganapati and Ganapati 2008) . Kitakami (within Ishinomaki city) was hard-hit by the tsunami, and 200 of 3900 residents perished. Much of the region's coastal plain and the banks of the Kitakami River had been occupied by small fishing villages. Following the tsunami, a grassroots planning committee was mobilized to engage local stakeholders, especially local women's groups, in recovery, and the design of relocation projects in particular. In partnership with government officials, architects from Sendai city, and Hokkaido University researchers, the Kitakami recovery committee planned eight new communities, now constructed or still being constructed, on higher ground above the coastal zone. Seven of those relocation communities were built as one-for-one replacements, allowing survivors from the original villages to remain together. One relocation site, Nikkori Danchi, was designed as a In response, the city of Higashimatsushima began building seven all-new communities for displaced residents. Similar relocations have occurred throughout the Tohoku region mixed community for any residents displaced by the tsunami in the affected area. The new community sites are located within 3-4 km of the original villages. Input from residents resulted in increased space for house gardens and additional community parks that were not in the original plan.
The great wall of Japan
The 2011 tsunami destroyed or severely damaged 190 km of seawalls and other coastal protection structures in the Tohoku region. In addition to relocations following 2011, Japan has been reconstructing the tsunami protection system, including significant additions and enlargement to structures along 457 km of coastline. At an estimated cost of at least $8 billion, the project has been called "the Great Wall of Japan". In fact, the impressive concrete coastal structures now being constructed are envisioned as part of a broader "zone defense" (Fig. 3) , including roads and other structures as secondary tsunami barriers. To finance post-tsunami recovery, including structural as well as non-structural measures, the Japanese government levied a 2.1% income tax surcharge on all residents nationwide, beginning in 2013 and slated to last 25 years.
A vocal group of Japanese residents, environmentalists, and coastal scientists opposed construction of the large new tsunami barrier system. Concerns included the degradation of the coastal ecosystem and aesthetics, with the new barrier largely cutting off the Tohoku region from its shoreline and from the ocean. But in the wake of the apocalyptic damage in 2011, political sentiments leaned strongly toward protection at almost any cost. One solitary, and only partial, ecological victory occurred at Oya Beach, in Miyagi prefecture. Officials initially planned a 9.8-m-high and 40-m-wide concrete seawall on the only open land seaward of the coastal highway at Oya, directly on top of the white sand beach of this scenic and popular location. Local residents, especially youth groups, objected and proposed a change to the design-to move the seawall back from the beach and relocate the road to the top of the barrier. Objections to this modest request did not focus on engineering challenges or cost, but instead were jurisdictional-seawalls in Japan are under the control of the Forestry Agency, whereas national highways are managed by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism. No shared project was considered possible. In the Fig. 3 Following the 2011 tsunami, Japan adopted a multilayered approach to protection and risk management. The 2011 tsunami was an extreme event, much larger than previous tsunami recorded over centuries, and arguably too large for any single defense. As an alternative, a coastal barrier system that protects against smaller events was combined with additional barriers, often multi-use structures, as well as land-use controls and evacuation planning. end, following determined lobbying by local stakeholders as well as growing national press attention on Oya, officials bent the rigid bureaucratic framework enough to accommodate the locals' road-on-seawall design, saving their beach. Barrier construction is going on right now. In none of our interviews, however, were locals willing to address the larger question, which was why the Oya segment of the tsunami barrier was being constructed at all, when essentially all of the residents of the narrow strip of coastal land behind the wall had relocated to higher ground after 2011.
Conclusions
Natural disasters are milestone events that often reshape national policy. The Tohoku tsunami in 2011 was a truly catastrophic event, with transformative impacts on the Japanese psyche and on disaster recovery and preparedness investments and policies. Despite a long history of damaging tsunami, Japan emerged from 2011 with a new national resolve to invest in sweeping mitigation measures, both structural and non-structural. Structural investments focused on an upgraded $8 billion tsunami barrier system along 457 km of the coastline worst hit in 2011, including multiple lines of structural defenses, supplemented by land-use planning and relocations. Opponents of the structural coastal barrier point out several negative impacts: damage to coastal ecosystems, severing of the region from its shoreline and the ocean, and the fact that this massive investment was focused on the Tohoku region, leaving the rest of Japan's coasts without upgraded protection. Recovery from the 2011 tsunami also involved a paradigm shift in non-structural land-use management, preventing residential reconstruction on high-hazard land in the affected area. This represented a policy shift for Japan and would be almost unthinkable in the USA, where private-property rights are a political religion, stymieing managed retreat even after multiple flood disasters. In Japan, after the 2011 tsunami, the Tohoku coastal margin has been largely depopulated-of residents, and residential structures, at least. Community relocations have been a central part of that post-tsunami retreat, providing housing for survivors and keeping communities intact to the extent possible. Managed retreat is perhaps the most challenging tool for addressing coastal and river hazards and climate change. Planners and policymakers in the USA and worldwide should look to Japan for lessons learned that can be adapted to local needs.
